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THE 1974 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF WAR: A VICTORY FOR POLITICAL CAUSES
AND A RETURN TO THE "JUST WAR" CONCEPT
OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY
DAVID E. GRAHAM*
To many individuals, attorneys as well as laymen, the phrase
"Law of War" appears to be a contradiction in terms. The feasibility
of establishing rules and regulations by which men intentionally and
systematically kill other human beings is continually questioned in
many quarters. The attempt to place legal restraints on organized
violence is often viewed as at best a ludicrous act, and at worst, as
an attempt to legitimate irrational and immoral behavior. However,
even the most severe critics of the law of armed conflict must ac-
knowledge that history bears stark witness to the fact that war has
been a constant companion of human affairs.
In the 3,500 years since man began writing his history, he has
recorded only 270 years unmarked by conflict.1 The United States
itself has enjoyed only two brief decades of peace in the last two
centuries. Thus, though the nature of war has changed as civilization
and technology have changed, Isaiah's prophecy of swords being
beaten into plowshares has not come to pass.2 Instead, the 2,400
years since Plato's death have proved his prediction that only the
dead have seen the end of war; current evidence of his philosophi-
cal foresight lies in the fact that violence continues to flourish in
today's international community in the form of "wars of self-
determination. ' 3 Acknowledging the reality of war and the death and
destruction resulting from it, men have attempted both to control the
means and methods of waging combat and to eliminate the unneces-
sary suffering of combatants and non-combatants, on and off the
* Captain, U.S. Army, JAGC: Associate Professor, International Law, The Judge
Advocate General's School of the Army. B.A. (1966), Texas A.&M. University; M.A.
International Affairs (1968), The George Washington University; J.D. (1971), Univer-
sity of Texas. Member, Texas Bar Association, American Bar Association, American
Society of International Law. The opinions and conclusions presented herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's School of the Army or of any other governmental agency.
I L. MoNTRoss, WAR THROUGH THE AGEs 313 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Isaiah 2:4.
' This concept is extensively discussed at a later point. See notes 24-26, 28-67 and
accompanying text infra.
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battlefield. The Law of War 4 has been consistently developed on the
premise that excessive violence and needless destruction are super-
fluous to actual military necessity, and are not only immoral but also
counterproductive to the attainment of the objectives of the use of
military force.
In February and March of 1974, representatives of the interna-
tional community met in Geneva for a Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, ostensibly aimed at once again mod-
ernizing and supplementing the humanitarian safeguards of the cur-
rent law in this area. Many government representatives entered this
session with the belief that substantial progress could be made to-
ward improving the plight of those unfortunate enough to be involved
in future conflicts. Indeed, as the conference began, chances of suc-
cess in this most difficult and complex field of international law were
viewed with. at least guarded optimism. 5 As the conference ran its
course, however, this optimism gave way to a pervasive atmosphere
of frustration and well-reasoned concern by many of the participants
for the future stability of the entire structure of the Law of War. Upon
its termination, all delegates agreed that events which occurred dur-
ing this diplomatic session will have a significant, and in the view of
some, a disastrous impact on the international community as a
whole.
As the American delegation prepares to attend a second diplo-
matic conference dealing with the Law of War which convenes in
early 1975, it is essential that the events leading to the 1974 Diplo-
matic Conference as well as the conference itself be analyzed. The
ramifications of the results of that conference and of the factors which
The "Law of War" has been defined in many ways. For purposes of this study,
this area of international jurisprudence is divided into three distinct areas: (1) Conflict
Management-rules which attempt to prohibit or minimize the impact of armed con-
flict in the international community; (2) The Hague Regulations-rules contained in
the Annex of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which control the actual conduct
of combat; and (3) the 1949 Geneva Conventions-agreements which pertain to the
humanitarian protections accorded combatants and non-combatants, both on and off
the battlefield. Many have expressed the view that only the Hague Regulations may
validly be categorized as the "Law of War." These individuals consider it inappro-
priate to classify conflict management norms in terms of the Law of War. Others prefer
to think of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as an integral part of "international humani-
tarian law." Hopefully, the discussion which follows will demonstrate the interrela-
tionship of each of these aspects of the Law of War.
I As an example of the goals associated with this form of optimism, see Prugh,
Current Initiatives to Reaffirm and Develop International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflict, 8 Int'l Law. 262 (1974).
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should be considered by the United States delegation to the 1975
session also merit detailed examination.
I. EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1974 DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF WAR
While demonstrating the apparent inevitability of war, history
has called attention to the fact that the laws of war have been devel-
oped on the basis of past experience. The drafters of the Hague Con-
ventions of 1907 drew upon the experience of the conflicts of the 19th
century and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. In much the same way,
the 1929 Geneva Conventions were considered in the context of World
War I and the 1949 Geneva Conventions dealt with issues that arose
out of World War II. It is therefore not suprising that the existing Law
of War has proven somewhat inadequate in dealing with situations
which have evolved out of the conflicts in Southeast Asia, Southern
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Civil wars, mixed civil and inter-
national conflicts, and guerrilla warfare in general have all given rise
to problems under the 1949 Conventions and 1907 Hague Regula-
tions.'
Recognizing the fact that modem methods and means of conduct-
ing warfare often present insoluble problems when viewed in the con-
text of existing law, the XXth International Conference of the Red
Cross, meeting at Vienna in 1965, urged the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC)7 to pursue the development of international
' The 1907 Hague Conventions and 1949 Geneva Conventions are generally con-
sidered the basic codified concepts of the Law of War. See note 4 supra. The Hague
Conventions concern the legitimate means and methods of conducting combat, while
the 1949 Geneva Conventions are concerned with humanitarian protections. The Con-
ventions relative to the matters under consideration are: Annex to Hague Convention
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
T.S. No. 539, II MAnLoY, TREATmS 2269; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
[hereinafter cited as GPW], Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S.
287.
, The International Committee of the Red Cross was formed in 1863 as the Inter-
national Committee for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers. The present name was
adopted in 1880. The Committee's headquarters are in Geneva; its officers are of Swiss
nationality. This organization promoted the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929
1975]
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humanitarian law.8 Consistent with this recommendation, in May
1967 the ICRC suggested that all states parties to to the 1949 Conven-
tions consider restoring certain aspects of the Law of War which had
fallen into disuse through the years. An inventory of prevailing stan-
dards was distributed to these states.'
In May of 1968, the United Nations Conference on Human Rights
invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to contact the
ICRC with a view toward initiating an extensive study of the current
Law of War.'0 In September of that same year, the ICRC informed
representatives of the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion
and Sun) Societies that it was launching a new effort to reaffirm and
develop humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. In so doing,
it pointed out that the 1949 Geneva Conventions, almost twenty years
old, showed significant shortcomings due to a lack of balance between
their basically humanitarian rules of protection and those rules and
regulations which were related to the actual conduct of hostilities.
This was particularly felt to be true in the area of protection of civil-
ian populations. The ICRC was quick to note, however, that there
would be no attempt to revise these Conventions, for, if fully applied,
these were viewed as offering effective guarantees to the victims of
conflicts. Efforts were to be directed toward supplementing the Con-
ventions and giving added precision on certain fundamental points.1'
Preparations for the conference, at which concrete rules to supple-
ment existing international law in this area were to be adopted, con-
sumed almost six years and required numerous consultations among
various international and governmental bodies. 2 Two protocols
and 1949, dealing with a series of matters concerning victims of war. The Committee
is referred to throughout this article as the ICRC.
, This action is generally regarded as the initial step in the series of events leading
to the 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War. XXth International Conference
of the Red Cross, Resolution XXVIII (Vienna, 1965), reprinted at 75 INT'L REV. OF THE
RED CROss 305 (1967).
For a text of this ICRC circular (Circular No. 468), see 75 INT'L REV. OF THE RED
Caoss 300-11 (1967).
10 For a text of the resolution adopted by this Conference, see 90 INT'L REv. OF THE
RED CROss 472-74 (1968).
11 Of special interest is the fact that the ICRC's efforts were directed only toward
the supplementation and clarification of the 1949 Conventions. This original intent on
the part of the ICRC is of particular importance in the discussion that follows.
12 In September 1969 at Istanbul, the XXIst International Conference of the Red
Cross unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the ICRC to draft concrete rules
which would supplement existing international humanitarian law and invited govern-
ment experts to meet for consultations with the ICRC on such proposals. For the text
of this resolution, see 104 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 615-16 (1969). On the basis of
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evolved from these deliberations-Protocol I on International Armed
Conflicts and Protocol II on Non-International Armed Conflicts. As
a result of two Conferences of Government Experts, the ICRC revised
both of these protocols and prepared commentaries thereon. In revis-
ing the protocols, the ICRC emphasized that problems relating to
atomic, bacteriological, and chemical warfare were subjects most
suitable for specific international agreements or negotiations by gov-
ernments on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Consequently, these
matters were not dealt with in the protocols submitted for considera-
tion. In order to study these documents, the. Swiss Government con-
vened the 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War. Anxious
to ensure maximum participation in a conference of this importance,
the Swiss extended invitations to all states parties to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and all members of the United Nations.
On hundred and twenty-five states appeared at the conference.
The United States delegation was headed by George H. Aldrich, Dep-
this resolution, in May 1971 the ICRC convened a three week "Conference of Govern-
ment Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts," to which some thirty-nine governments, includ-
ing the United States, sent experts. These individuals considered various proposals.
that were placed before the Conference by the ICRC.
Unable to cover all of its agenda and confronted with complaints that there had
not been a sufficiently representative group of states present, this Conference
requested the convening of a second session open to all states parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. This second meeting took place in Geneva from May 3 to June
3, 1972, and was attended by more than 400 experts delegated by seventy-seven govern-
ments. The subject matter considered by those attending consisted of two protocols
drafted by the staff of the ICRC-Protocol I on International Armed Conflicts and
Protocol II on Non-International Armed Conflicts. In addition to the two sessions of
the Conference of Government Experts, the ICRC arranged a number of consultative
meetings with interested individuals and groups. In particular, it submitted drafts in
1971 and 1972 to Red Cross experts and representatives of non-governmental organiza-
tions in order to benefit from their opinions.
During this same time period, 1968-1972, the ICRC remained in constant contact
with the United Nations and closely followed the work of the General Assembly in the
area of human rights in armed conflicts. Beginning in 1968, the Assembly adopted a
series of resolutions dealing with this area of the law. Prior to the passage of each
resolution, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly detailed reports on var-
ious aspects of human rights during hostilities. Representative of such reports is that
of 1970. See Report of the Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970). Additionally, representatives of the Secretary-
General actively participated in the two Conferences of Government Experts. These
events undoubtedly acted as an effective incentive for the ICRC to move forward as
quickly as possible with its work, since the ICRC views itself as a more objective and
less politicized organization than the United Nations and as a more appropriate body
than the United Nations to address these problems. The author concurs in this view.
1975]
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uty Legal Adviser, Department of State. Having done extensive work
toward formulating detailed positions on each of the two protocols,
the Unites States delegation was prepared to engage in extensive
negotiations on an article by article basis. As the conference opened,
it became obvious that this was not to occur.
II. THE 1974 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF
WAR
During the five weeks of planned conference activities, four major
obstacles prevented delegates from reaching agreement on any mat-
ters of substantive significance. Three of these areas of diplomatic
confrontation concerned the organization of the conference itself,
while the fourth and most serious point of conflict resulted from
events which occurred in the first of the conference's three main
committees.1'
A. Organizational Problems of the Conference
Prior to convening the conference, the Swiss Government pro-
posed that negotiations and debate take place in three primary Com-
mittees and that an Ad Hoc Committee on Weapons be organized to
discuss matters of concern in this particular area of the law. The
conference agreed to this proposal. Committee I addressed the gen-
eral provisions of Protocol I (International Armed Conflicts) and Pro-
tocol II (Non-International Armed Conflicts), Committee II was as-
signed the provisions of the Protocols concerning wounded, sick and
shipwrecked persons, and Committee I was given responsibility for
those articles dealing with the civilian population, methods and
means of combat, and a new category of prisoners of war.
With the election of Mr. Pierre Graber, Vice President of the
Swiss Federal Council and Head of the Political Department as Presi-
dent of the conference, the session opened in an atmosphere of agree-
ment and purpose. However, this mood of optimism was quickly
dispelled by the first of the three organizational matters which were
to plague the substantive work of the delegates.
In months prior to the convening of the conference, the Swiss
Government had consulted with a number of states that were to
participate on the question of the manner in which the various con-
'" The discussion of the conference which follows is based primarily on an unpub-
lished report of the United States delegation attending the session, submitted to the
Secretary of State on June 10, 1974, by Mr. Aldrich and prepared by Richard R.
Baxter, a member of the delegation [hereinafter cited as Delegation Report].
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ference offices were to be filled. On the basis of these consultations,
the Swiss Government submitted certain proposals to the diplomatic
session as a whole. It soon became apparent, however, that these
proposals were not acceptable to a majority of the delegations pres-
ent. Debate revealed a widely held belief that offices should be allo-
cated among regional groups, similar to the practice of the United
Nations. As a result of this unexpected development, various regional
groups were forced to engage in somewhat prolonged consultations in
order to arrive at an acceptable allocation of offices." Final agree-
ment was not achieved until March 1, more than one week after
convocation of the session.
5
While the delegates were wrestling with the problem of officer
allocation, a second and more serious obstacle to the initiation of
substantive negotiations surfaced. This was the volatile question of
whether states or organizations which had not received official Swiss
invitations to attend the conference should nevertheless be allowed
to participate in conference activities. This problem was fourfold.
Guinea-Bissau, which had acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, with reservations, shortly before the opening of the conference,
had not received an invitation to attend. This newly evolved state
was nonetheless invited to participate in the activities of the session,
a decision that was taken without a vote. Although the United States
accepted this decision, it did submit a statement for the record em-
phasizing that its acceptance did not constitute any formal or infor-
mal recognition of Guinea-Bissau.
A more difficult question pertaining to representation occurred in
the form of African and Arab national liberation movements, an issue
which was foreshadowed by resolutions of the 1973 International Red
Cross Conference and the United Nations General Assembly at its
Twenty-eighth Session. These resolutions specifically called for par-
ticipation of the liberation movements in the conference.' The at-
tempt to extend invitations to liberation groups was vigorously op-
posed by the United States and several other countries of the West.
European and Others (WEO) regional group. Opposition was based
on the fact that past experience indicated that the participation of
11 The United States was a member of the West European and Others regional
group (WEO).
,1 In the allocation of offices, Mr. Aldrich was elected to the Credentials Commit-
tee and Mr. Baxter, Rapporteur of Committee I, a post which also entailed member-
ship on the Drafting Committee. Mr. Aldrich additionally served as Chairman of the
WEO.
16 U.N.G.A. Res. 3102 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
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these organizations in the conference would most probably hinder
any serious efforts toward advancing human rights in armed con-
flicts. The view was also expressed that since none of the organiza-
tions had gained international recognition as the legitimate repre-
sentatives of an established state, they had no basis for participating
in a conference called for the expressed purpose of formulating new
concepts of international law.
The various liberation movements and their supporters 7 refused
to consider any form of settlement that called for the former to partic-
ipate in the conference only as observers or as part of delegations from
regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity.
Many developing states continued to demand that each liberation
movement be extended the rights and privileges of a sovereign state,
including the right to cast a vote on every issue.
As in the problem of allocation of conference officers, it was not
until March 1 that a resolution of invitation was agreed upon. The
two most significant paragraphs of this resolution stipulated that the
conference:
1. Decides to invite the National Liberation Movements
which are recognized by the regional intergovermental organi-
zations concerned, to participate fully in the deliberations of
the Conference and its Main Committees;
2. Decides further that, notwithstanding anything con-
tained in the rules of procedure, the statements made or the
proposals and amendments submitted by delegations of such
National Liberation Movements shall be circulated by the
Conference Secretariat as Conference documents to all the
participants in the Conference, it being understood that only
delegations representing States or governments will be entitled
to vote. 8
As in the case of Guinea-Bissau, this resolution was adopted by the
conference without a vote.
"? The supporters of such movements consisted primarily of Communist and third
world states.
Delegation Report, supra note 13, at 4.
" Those liberation movements attending the conference on the basis of the terms
embodied in the Resolution were the African National Congress, the Angola National
Liberation Front, the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation, the Panafricanist Congress, the People's Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola, the Seychelles People's United Party, the South West African People's Organiza-
tion, the Zimbabwe African National Union, and the Zimbabwe African People's
Union.
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In agreeing to this procedure, the Chairman of the United States
delegation emphasized that participation by these groups in this par-
ticular diplomatic session should not be regarded as a precedent for
future international conferences. Moreover, it is important to note
that votes on each of these questions of representation were avoided
only because there was a general consensus to do so, even though
there was no consensus on the issuance of the invitations.
2 0
The third and most serious problem of representation confronting
the conference delegates was that of the "Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Repulic of South Vietnam" (PRG), a group which
had submitted an instrument of accession to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 only a month before the beginning of the conference. From
the very first efforts by the PRG to gain representation, it was readily
apparent that its objective was simply to use the conference as a
public rostrum from which to carry out a time-consuming and pur-
poseless propaganda campaign against both the Republic of Vietnam
and the United States. This pattern of diplomatic behavior on the
part of the PRG appeared to be particularly unsuited for a conference
charged with supplementing the Law of War and advancing the cause
of human rights in armed conflict.
In a significant tactical error, the delegation of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) walked out of the conference immedi-
ately following its speech on the question of the PRG's participation
in the proceedings, two days prior to the vote on this matter. This was
done as an expression of its disapproval of the failure of Switzerland
to extend an invitation to this group. Seizing upon the diplomatic
opportunity provided by the DRV's absence, the United States ac-
tively sought either the adverse vote or abstention of as many delega-
tions as possible. In the most dramatic vote of the conference, as of
that point in the proceedings, the proposal to extend an invitation to
the PRG to participate in the session was defeated by a vote of 37 to
38, with 33 abstentions, two-thirds being required for passage.2'
The fourth and last organizational obstacle to achieving any sub-
stantive success occurred in the form of credentials. For varying rea-
sons, the legitimacy of the credentials of several delegations attend-
ing the conference were challenged. Reservations were stated with
respect to the Republic of Vietnam (a state which some delegations
said should be represented in whole or in part by the PRG), South
Africa (due to its policy of apartheid), Portugal (on the grounds that
Delegation Report, supra note 13, at 4.
Id. at 5.
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it had no right to speak for its overseas territories), the Khmer Repub-
lic (which several states asserted should have been represented by the
Sihanouk regime), and Israel (on the ground that it was an aggressor).
All of these reservations were noted and generated a certain degree
of acrimonious debate. However, the report of the Credentials Com-
mittee was adopted without a vote, and no delegation was denied its
right to participate.
From the nature of the four organizational difficulties which con-
sumed the initial portion of the conference proceedings, it is evident
that many of the delegations in attendance were significantly more
interested in achieving political goals than in working toward a mean-
ingful and effective Law of War. The true degree to which many
states were willing to put political causes ahead of substantive
achievement was demonstrated during the early meetings of Com-
mittee I.
B. The Work of the Conference: A Committee I Challenge to the
Law of War
Use of the phrase "work of the conference" in describing the var-
ious efforts of the three primary committees is a complete misnomer.
The fact that virtually all of the work of the conference remains to
be done at the second session which convenes in early 1975 indicates
how little was accomplished during the five week conference of 1974.
Due to the organizational problems which beset the proceedings and
the activities of Committee I, only two weeks were devoted to sub-
stantive work.
During these two weeks of discussion, the conference failed to
adopt a single provision of the more than 150 articles contained in the
Draft Additional Protocols. Four articles and several paragraphs of a
fifth were adopted in Committee I, and a technical annex on the
identification of medical and civil defense personnel, transports, and
installations were drafted but not adopted by a sub-committee of
Committee 11.22 Though there has been disappointment expressed
over the fact that very little of any real value was accomplished in
Committees II and III, it is the action that was taken in Committee
I that has generated serious concern, not only for the success of the
1975 Conference but also for the future viability of the Law of War.
Moreover, until the issues which Committee I's actions created are
effectively dealt with, any further discussion concerning the particu-
22 Id. at 6.
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lar provisions of Protocols I and II is rendered moot for all intents and
purposes.
As Committee I opened its deliberations, three proposals were
immediately submitted with respect to wars of "national liberation"
and "self-determination"-a Soviet bloc proposal, a proposal by
Algeria and fourteen other states (including Australia and Norway),
and a proposal by Romania. Each of these would have had the effect
of amending article 1 of Protocol I by making the law governing
international conflicts applicable to wars fought for "self-
determination against alien occupation or against colonialist or racist
regimes." These three proposals were subsequently withdrawn, how-
ever, in favor of an expanded proposal of a similar nature, sponsored
by 51 states. This proposal, together with another unrelated amend-
ment to article 1, became Document CDDH/I/71, a document orgin-
ally submitted by Argentina, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and
Peru.2
This proposed amendment of article 1 was vigorously opposed by
the United States and a number of its European allies. Arguments
as to the detrimental effect its adoption would have on the interna-
tional community were forcefully stated. However, states of the So-
viet bloc and the less developed countries, the principal supporters
of the amendment, were adamant in their insistence upon the mea-
sure's adoption and expressed no interest in any form of compromise.
As debate on the issue ended and a vote was taken, it was apparent
that the sponsors of the proposal had far more than the necessary
number of ballots. In an unmistakable expression of their acceptance
of a "new" approach to the Law of War and their rejection of its
traditional and current bases of application, the overwhelming ma-
jority of state delegates to Committee I voted for the adoption of
Document CDDH/I/71.
The text of amended article 1, approved by a vote of 70 to 21, with
13 abstentions, reads as follows:
1. The present Protocol, which supplements the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Vic-
tims, shall apply in the situations referred to in article 2 com-
mon to these Conventions.
2. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph
include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial and alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter
I Id. at 7.
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of the United Nations and Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
to ensure respect for the present Protocol in all circumstances.
4. In cases not included in the present Protocol or in other
instruments of treaty law, civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of interna-
tional law derived from established custom, from the principle
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. 4
In retrospect, the importance attached to and the support exhib-
ited for this amendment by many of the delegations and their insist-
ence upon placing its ideological acceptance before concepts of hu-
manitarianism should have come as no great surprise. In recent years,
wars of national liberation and self-determination have gained wide-
spread support, especially from the newly evolved and third world
states. Several international publicists, enamored with the idea of
courageous men and women idealistically fighting for the freedom of
various "peoples," have developed the somewhat novel "poor guer-
rilla" theory, a concept that calls for special legal considerations to
be given the often treacherous but always well-meaning revolutionary
organizations engaged in guerrilla activities in various parts of the
world . 5 Moreover, recent documents of the United Nations, with its
General Assembly now dominated by third world countries, have
supported and broadly expanded the entire concept of self-
determination .2 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the oppor-
tunity to force Western European and North American states to ac-
cept the basically third world concepts of national liberation and self-
determination in the form of amended article 1 was most certainly
viewed by the latter as a tremendous potential victory in their strug-
gle to restructure traditional international law in a manner that
would best meet their own particular needs and desires.
Based on the significant decree of support exhibited for amended
24 Id. at 9.
2 For a sympathetic treatment of the guerilla and his plight under existing inter-
national law, see T. FARER, THE LAWS OF WAR 25 YEARS AFTER NUREMBERG (1971); and
Statement of Tom Farer, The Law of Armed Conflict, 78-79, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1971).
1, See U.N. Documents discussed at notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
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article 1 in Committee I, it was generally felt that the measure might
be submitted to the final plenary session of the conference and
adopted by the requisite two-thirds vote. However, amidst a mixed
atmosphere of surprise, disappointment, and relief, no final action
was taken on article 1 by the conference as a whole. Instead, at the
final plenary session, the following draft resolution was submitted by
India and adopted without a vote:
The Conference,
Adopting the report of Committee I, containing its recom-
mendation in paragraph 37 [that the text of article 1 approved
by the Committee be adopted by the Conference],
Welcomes the adoption of article 1 of draft Protocol I by
Committee I.
Thus, amended article 1 has not been finally adopted. The dra-
matic shift in the concept of the applicability of the Law of War, so
vigorously supported by advocates of wars of national liberation and
self-determination, is not yet an accomplished fact. However, on the
basis of the widespread enthusiasm demonstrated for the measure
during the 1974 Conference, it is apparent that barring any substan-
tial change in attitude by a sizable number of states, the formal
adoption of article 1 is a virtual certainty in 1975. This fact gives rise
to the basic consideration of whether the adoption of the article and
the resultant shift in the types of conflict controlled by the traditional
codified concepts of the Law of War will actually prove to be detri-
mental to the law's current degree of effectiveness. In short, what are
the arguments for and against the adoption of this measure, and what
are the major international ramifications that would flow from its
final acceptance in 1975? The entire structure of the Law of War,
present and future, now hinges upon the manner in which these issues
are resolved and the nature of the decision made with regard to
whether the United States and other major states should agree to be
bound by the terms of article 1.
III. AMENDED ARTICLE 1: A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN THE
TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF THE LAW OF WAR
The major thrust of the argument advanced by those states advo-
cating the adoption of amended article 1 centers around the fact that
specific terms of the United Nations Charter and numerous resolu-
tions of the General Assembly interpreting and implementing the
21 Delegation Report, supra note 13, at 9.
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Charter state that peoples under colonial rule or otherwise denied
their right of self-determination are entitled to independence. This
being so, advocates of the amendment reason that these "peoples"
may assert their right through the use of force and that the ensuing
conflict must be categorized as international in nature, governed by
the provisions of Protocol I.
Inherent in this contention is the thought, advanced during the
past several decades by many of the newly evolved states, that the
entire body of international jurisprudence must be modified in ways
that will take into consideration their desires and needs. These states
have consistently espoused the belief that international law as it
presently exists is largely a product of Western European and indus-
trialized North American countries, formulated on the concepts of
colonialism, capitalism, and Christianity. As a result, many of its
traditional rules are said to be inapplicable to the international com-
munity of the late twentieth century. The Law of War is considered
a conspicuous example of these antiquated principles.
A discussion of this argument and the ramifications which would
flow from its successful translation into the adoption of amended
article 1 by the 1975 Diplomatic Conference can be accomplished by
an analysis of three major problem areas: (a) the effect of article 1
upon international peace and security; (b) the circumstances under
which certain national liberation movements would fall within the
ambit of article 1; and (c) the effect of article 1 upon individual
combatants engaged in armed conflicts.
A. The Effect of Article I Upon International Peace and Security
One of the principal concerns of those opposed to the adoption of
article 1 is its marked tendency to restructure completely those con-
cepts of international law which address the use of armed force in
international relations. 9 The most cursory study of the United Na-
tions Charter evidences the fact that one of its primary goals is to
prohibit the forceful settlement of international disputes. The
Charter clearly prohibits a state from employing a threat or use of
armed force, 3 except in instances of legitimate individual or collec-
2 If this argument proves successful, it is quite likely that proponents of amended
article 1 will contend that in addition to the provisions of Protocol 1, each of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions must be deemed applicable to struggles "sanctioned" by the
United Nations.
n See note 4 supra regarding the norms of conflict management.
10 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, paras. 3-4.
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tive self-defense 3' or in support of Security Council action pursuant
to article 39. Moreover, no specific Charter article confers a positive
right to use force on a self-help basis in order to achieve any of the
enumerated purposes of the Charter,32 including that of self-
determination. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, public inter-
national law, including the Charter, only refers to the use of force by
states in the international community. Periodic struggles by individ-
uals against recognized governments within the territorial confines of
a state have been considered solely matters of internal concern, af-
fected by international rules and requirements only to a limited
degree.?
3' Id., art. 51.
' The purposes of the United Nations are stated in Article 1 of the Charter.
3 These non-international conflicts are the sole subject matter of Protocol II. An
attempt is made in this document to formulate specific rules and regulations applica-
ble to these internal struggles. Currently, only common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions refers to conflicts of this nature:
ARTICLE 3. - CONFLICTS NOT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CHARACTER
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the Conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions;
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including mem-
bers of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those places
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons;
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilations, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humili-
ating and degarding treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provi-
sions of the present Convention.
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Notwithstanding these facts, however, amended article 1 of the
Protocol defines the scope of international armed conflicts as includ-
ing those "in which peoples are fighting against colonial and alien
occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations."34 Although the Declaration
on Friendly Relations is a resolution of the General Assembly and
thus not a binding international agreement, it is nevertheless gener-
ally considered to reflect recognized international law concepts. How-
ever, the Declaration is relatively innocuous and does not recognize
any right to achieve self-determination or independence by force of
arms. 3 Consequently, reference to the Charter and the Declaration
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
GPW, supra note 6, art. 3.
31 Delegation Report, supra note 13, at 9.
3 The Declaration provides in pertinent part:
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, the realization of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying
out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the
implementation of the principle in order:
(a) to promote friendly relations and co-operation among
States; and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind
that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and ex-
ploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial
of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations.
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and inde-
pendence. In their actions against resistance to such forcible action in
pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peo-
ples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter of the United Nations, a status separate and dis-
tinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such sepa-
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on Friendly Relations in a multinational convention which defines
the scope of international armed conflict as including wars of self-
determination against colonialist and racist regimes results in a mis-
leading impression; i.e., that it is the intent of these documents to
sanction the use of force by certain "peoples" seeking to achieve an
inherent right. Such an impression is extremely dangerous as well as
legally unfounded. However, it has recently attained significant cred-
ibility as a result of several developments in the international com-
munity.
Throughout the last decade and continuing into the 1970s, sub-
stantial support has been demonstrated for conflicts waged for the
avowed purpose of freeing certain "peoples" from a particular form
of oppressive rule or creating a state where none previously existed.
This sentiment was largely fostered by the war in Viet Nam. While
Western European and United States authorities have consistently
viewed these conflicts in terms of traditional concepts of conflict
management, various other states have urged that special considera-
tion be given participants in these "just wars." They argue that inas-
much as the guerrilla patriot is fighting for an obviously just cause,
he must not be restricted in his activities and methods of combat by
traditional legal concepts largely formulated by the colonialist, impe-
rialist, and racist states against whom he wages these wars of self-
determination. The justness and correctness of his cause demands
that the guerrilla be unfettered by legal principles that would stand
in the way of the achievement of his goals. He cannot and must not
be held to the same standards of international conduct expected of
states and their uniformed combatants. Moreover, these states con-
tend that the concept of conflicts waged in the name of self-
determination is sanctioned by the United Nations and thereby ap-
proved by the international community, and must not be thought of
in terms of traditional internal conflicts outside the purview of other
states, but rather as one of struggles deserving both the moral and
physical support of all countries. Several recent actions of the United
rate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people
of the colony or non-self-governing territory have exercised their right
of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly
its purposes and principles.
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. 28 (A/8028) (1970) (em-
phasis supplied).
31 That is, in terms of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
specific provisions of the U.N. Charter. See notes 30-31, 32 supra and note 45 infra.
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Nations serve to demonstrate the substantive degree of international
support that has been generated for this point of view.
On December 12, 1973, the United Nations General Assembly
voted 83-13-19 to adopt a resolution entitled Basic Principles of the
Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and
Alien Domination and Racist Regimes. In its preamble, this resolu-
tion stated that colonialism is a crime which all colonial people have
a right to oppose by any means necessary for success in their
struggle." Among the operative provisions, two stand out:
2. Any attempt to suppress the struggle against colonial and
alien domination and racist regimes . . . constitutes a threat
to international peace and security.
3. The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are
to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged
to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
• . . is to apply to persons engaged in armed struggle against
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes."
This resolution was immediately preceded by another General As-
sembly resolution calling for the participation of national liberation
movements in the 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War.
39
Shortly after the adoption of these resolutions sanctioning the use
of force in achieving self-determination, the United Nations Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression adopted a draft
Definition of Aggression, accomplishing a task that had been under-
way since the earliest days of the organization. This document pro-
vides in relevant part:
Article 7-Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article
3, [enumeration of acts of force which qualify as acts of aggres-
sion] could in any way prejudice the right of self-
31 U.N.G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973). The preamble provides in perti-
nent part:
[T]hat the continuation of colonialism in all its forms and mani-
festations . . . is a crime and that colonial people have the inherent
right to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against colo-
nial powers and alien dominations in exercise of their right of self-
determination recognized in the Charter . . . and the Declaration
8 Id.
31 U.N.G.A. Res. 3102 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
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determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from
the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and re-
ferred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
. . . , particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples
to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in
accordance with the principle of the Charter and in conformity
with the above-mentioned Declaration.
40
United Nations documents such as these bear stark witness to the
fact that traditional concepts of conflict management are now
thought of by much of the international community as inappropriate
for "peoples" wars of "self-determination." An indication of the fu-
ture support given these conflicts by the majority of United Nations
members is evidenced in the remarks of the newly elected president
of the 29th General Assembly, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika
of Algeria. Shunning the impartial image past presidents have sought
to maintain, he opened this year's General Assembly by accepting the
office as a representative of ". . . generations of freedom fighters who
contributed to making a better world with weapons in their hands. '4
It is these individuals, he contended, who demonstrate that "...
revolutionary violence is the only way for people to liberate
themselves.
4 2
On the basis of the relevant United Nations documents that have
preceded it and the general tenor of current international opinion, it
is apparent that the adoption of amended article 1 would largely
vitiate current conflict management norms. This article, when con-
sidered in conjunction with the 1970 Declaration ofi Friendly Rela-
tions, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII)
and the newly drafted Definition of Aggression tends to legitimize
through positive international law a unilateral resort to armed force
in order to achieve self-determination. Moreover, a viable legal argu-
" U.N. Doc. A/Ac. 134/L. 46 (1974) (emphasis added).
The Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1974, at A-13, col. 1.
4' Id. Mr. Bouteflika has transformed his words into action. He recently wel-
comed Yassar Arafat, leader of the militant Palestine Liberation Organization, to the
United Nations General Assembly hall, introducing him as the "Commander-in-Chief
of the Palestine Revolution." Mr. Arafat was escorted into the hall by the United
Nations Chief of Protocol and provided with the type of armchair given only to heads
of state. Secretary-General Waldheim attempted to prevent this form of treatment
being accorded Mr. Arafat, but was reportedly told by Mr. Bouteflika "to mind his
own business." The Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1974, at A-18, col. 1.
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ment might well exist that, since a certain "people" may unilaterally
resort to force in order to achieve the internationally sanctioned right
of self-determination, third states also have the right or perhaps even
the duty to intervene militarily in support of these liberation move-
ments. It is not difficult to imagine the possible consequences of the
adoption of this theory by a substantial portion of the international
community. Existing legal prohibitions against the use of force in
order to achieve desired political goals would be completely negated.
Furthermore, the decision to sanction the use of force in the achieve-
ment of self-determination might establish a precedent that would
lead to the legitimation of unilateral or multilateral resort to force in
order to accomplish any of the purposes set forth in the United Na-
tions Charter. Such a result can readily and validly be analogized to
the eleventh century "just war" concept used during the Crusades to
justify killing in the name of God.
The effect that the adoption of amended article 1 will have on
established concepts of conflict management is substantial. Refer-
ence to struggles for self-determination in the context of an article
conferring a preferred status on particular armed conflicts elevates
the principle of self-determination to the position of a legal right,
justifying the use of armed force by now-favored liberation move-
ments and perhaps even by third states, despite the fact that neither
self-defense nor Security Council action is involved. Thus, where
claims of self-determination are espoused, war once again becomes a
legally recognized instrument for challenging and changing rights
based on existing international law.
As a result, attempts to use the United Nations Charter to prevent
unilateral recourse to war may be corrupted to the point that the
Charter serves not as a prohibition against, but instead as a justifi-
cation for again using armed force as an instrument for carrying out
national policy. The adoption of amended article 1 by a majority of
the world's states would clearly demonstrate a desire to refute the
basic prohibitions against the use of force contained in the Charter.
Discussion proceeds on the assumption that this desire will become
a reality in 1975.
B. The Circumstances Under Which Certain National Liberation
Movements Are To Be Considered Within The Ambit of Amended
Article 1.
It can be persuasively argued that the real importance of the
acceptance of amended article 1 by a majority of the international
community lies in the fact that this provision effectively transforms
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certain internal conflicts, which were previously considered matters
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a single state, into
international conflicts. Consequently, all rights and protections con-
tained in Protocol I and quite arguably those in each of the 1949
Geneva Conventions43 must be accorded the combatants. Thus, the
importance of common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions44 and draft
Protocol II (Non-International Armed Conflicts) is substantially re-
duced. Indeed, many states, including the People's Republic of
China, no longer view the latter document as necessary.
This transformation of certain internal conflicts into conflicts of
an international nature is viewed by some as an unprecedented in-
fringement upon state sovereignty45 and by others as an essential step
toward the universal application of the humanitarian aspects of the
Law of War. Regardless of the point of view, there is little doubt that
the purpose of amended article 1 is to control strictly the activities
of a state during certain instances of armed violence which may occur
totally within its own boundaries. This is especially significant in
light of the fact that Protocol I, in marked contrast to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, sets forth specific guidelines with regard not
only to humanitarian protection but also to the means and methods
by which combat can legitimately be conducted. Proponents of
amended article I would no doubt be quick to point out that the
provisions of Protocol I would also control the conduct of national
liberation groups. Yet due to the very nature of these conflicts, there
is reason to question both the ability and willingness of such groups
to adhere to the Protocol's provisions. This has led many observers
to the conclusion that amended article 1 would in reality severely
limit the defensive efforts of a government, while offering assistance
to those individuals engaged in a struggle against it.
3 See note 28 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
"' This contention is based on common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(see note 35 supra) and article 2, para. 7 of the United Nations Charter, which provides
in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter . . ..
46 In this respect, Protocol I differs substantially from the 1949 Conventions it is
intended to "supplement and clarify." These Conventions refer only to humanitarian
protections, while rules pertaining to the means and methods of conducting combat
are found only in the Hague Regulations. In Protocol I, specific guidelines relevant to
the conduct of conflict are found, in part, in articles 33-41, 43, 46-50, and 52-53.
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On one point, however, there is a full agreement. Adoption of
amended article I will result in a substantial change in the concepts
of international law applicable to struggles that have traditionally
been dealt with under existing international conventions as internal
conflicts. Given the effect this shift in the law could conceivably have
on many states within the international community, it is imperative
that specific guidelines be set forth with regard to the circumstances
under which certain liberation movements will be considered within
the ambit of amended article 1.
Before a detailed analysis of this particular issue is undertaken,
it is essential to examine a rather widespread misconception sur-
rounding the rights and privileges that must legally be accorded par-
ticipants in eligible movements under the provisions of this article.
Paragraph 1 of amended article 1" stipulates that Protocol I will
apply in its entirety to all situations referred to in common article 2
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thus, in order fully to understand
the scope of applicability of amended article 1 and its effect on libera-
tion movements, the specific wording of common article 2 must be
thoroughly considered:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said
Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.8
Paragraph 1 of amended article 1, in referring to common article
2, states that Protocol I will apply to "all cases of declared war or of
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them." This wording of common article 2 must be consid-
ered in conjunction with that of paragraph 2 of amended article 1,
" See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" GPW, supra note 6, at art. 2.
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which stipulates that the "cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties..." mentioned in common article 2 will include wars of self-
determination waged against colonial and alien occupation and racist
regimes.
Thus, although amended article 1 standing by itself does raise
certain armed struggles for self-determination to the level of interna-
tional conflicts addressed in paragraph 1 of common article 2, it must
be noted that paragraph 1 refers only to conflicts "which arise be-
tween two or more of the High Contracting Parties"; i.e., to states
party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is evident that national
liberation movements are not signatories of these Conventions.
Does this apparent inconsistency therefore mean that even though
a certain war of self-determination is considered an international
conflict in terms of amended article 1, a liberation movement has no
right to be accorded the codified guarantees and privileges of Protocol
I and the Conventions themselves, since it cannot be a signatory of
the 1949 Conventions? Paragraph 3 of common article 2 states that a
"Power" party to the 1949 Conventions is bound to abide by the
terms of those Conventions even when it is engaged in a conflict with
a "Power" not a signatory to the agreements, if the latter accepts and
applies the Convention provisions. As previously noted, it is most
improbable that liberation movements will be willing or able to con-
form to the Conventions and Protocol. More importantly, an exami-
nation of the official commentary to the 1949 Conventions evidences
the fact that the words "Power" and "Powers" which appear in para-
graph 3 of common article 2 refer to "states," in the most traditional
sense of that term in international law.49 In light of this fact, it ap-
pears that amended article 1 does not make national liberation move-
ments eligible to accede to the Geneva Conventions. As a result,
article 1 does not entitle these movements to the guarantees, protec-
tions, and privileges of Protocol I and the 1949 Conventions. At most,
amended article 1, as it is now worded, entitles national liberation
movements to the benefits and obligations which customary, rather
than codified, international law confers and imposes upon factions in
a civil war that has been recognized as a belligerency."
" COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION R TrvE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISON-
ERS OF WAR 25-26 (Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY (Pictet)].
0' As a result of the United Nations Charter and the development of other conflict
management norms, the concept of "belligerency" is now generally viewed as an out-
moded concept. Nevertheless, under traditional international law, if a civil struggle
was recognized as a belligerency by third states, the factions involved in this conflict
19751
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Legally, the foregoing argument is valid. However, it is essentially
polemical in nature and quite obviously contravenes the apparent
intent of the great majority of states attending the 1974 Diplomatic
Conference: i.e., that participants in certain specified wars of na-
tional liberation should be accorded all of the rights and privileges
set forth in Protocol I. Accordingly, it is inevitable that amendments
enabling certain liberation movements to become parties both to Pro-
tocol I and the Geneva Conventions will be offered at the Law of War
Conference in 1975. Past voting patterns indicate the acceptance of
such an amendment by the conference as a whole.
With these realities in mind, attention must be focused on the
circumstances under which liberation movements should be consid-
ered as falling within the ambit of amended article 1. If this provision
is legitimately to grant the rights and protections afforded by Proto-
col I to "peoples" engaged in "armed conflicts" in order to achieve
their "right of self-determination," those states advocating accept-
ance of this article in 1975 must respond intelligently and candidly
to several basic and inescapable questions surrounding the concept:
1. What is meant by the terms "peoples" and "right of
self-determination"?
2. What type of activity undertaken to achieve "self-
determination" constitutes an "armed conflict" in terms of
article 1? That is, under what circumstances do individuals
actively engaged in opposition to governmental authority qual-
ify for the rights and protections afforded by Protocol I?
3. What organization or body will be authorized to make
the various determinations as to whether certain "peoples" are
engaged in an "armed conflict" in order to achieve their "right
of self-determination"? Alternatively, may these determina-
tions be made by individual states?
4. What is meant by the phrase "colonial and alien occu-
pation and racist regimes"?
1. What is meant by the terms "peoples" and "right of
self-determination"?
Various state delegations expressed the fear that the meaning of
''peoples" was so unclear that a state might be required to treat an
ethnic minority in revolt as an international entity protected by Pro-
were to be accorded certain customary rights and privileges. For a discussion of this
concept and the rights and privileges to be accorded "belligerents," see 1 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 30-32, 52 (1940).
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tocol I and the 1949 Conventions. Such a fear and ones similar to it
are not unfounded. Commentators have consistently pointed out that
the term "peoples" has no generally accepted meaning which can be
applied to the diverse world of political and social reality.5 An ob-
vious example of the validity of this assertioi that has particular
relevance is the idealistic but misguided notion that United Nations
resolutions and the first articles of the two Covenants on Human
Rights asserting that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination" mean what they say; i.e., that all peoples indeed have
this right. Anyone tempted to accept an interpretation of such sim-
plicity should consider the situations of the Germans, Koreans, Viet-
namese, Biafrans or Ibos, South Sudanese, Baltic peoples, Formo-
sans, Somalis, and the Kurds and Armenians, to name only a few.
The granting of substantial international rights and protections to an
undefined number of individuals is both unwise and unrealistic.
"Peoples" must be defined.
There is a concomitant need for a definition of "self-
determination." Perhaps no international concept has been more
hotly debated in recent years. For example, though working with
substantially the same materials covering recent history and United
Nations practice, Dr. Rosalyn Higgins and Professor Leo Gross have
come to opposite conclusions regarding its legal validity. Whereas Dr.
Higgins finds it inescapable that such a right has come into being,
Professor Gross contends that it is an equally inescapable conclusion
that such a right is not one which can be characterized as based on
customary international law.12 Their views are representative of the
divergence of opinion on this matter which generally exists through-
out the international community.
Notwithstanding this lack of agreement, a careful analysis of the
right of self-determination strongly suggests that such a right does
exist. 3 The difficulty inherent in this principle lies not in the fact of
11 Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
52 R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 101-02 (1963); Gross, The Right of Self-Determination
in International Law, NEW STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD 44 (Kelsen ed. 1972).
" The United Nations Charter expressly refers to self-determination as a "prin-
ciple" in Articles 1(2) and 55. One of the purposes of the United Nations in Article
1(2) is to "[d]evelop friendly'relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ples of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... Article 55 reads in perti-
nent part that the United Nations shall work: "With a view to the creation of condi-
tions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples. . . ." Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is silent on the
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its existence but in a failure to articulate what the concept entails.
Logic dictates that the principle should be clearly defined. Specific
guidelines must be established regarding who may claim the right,
and how it may be validly exercised.54
2. What type of activity undertaken to achieve "self-
determination" constitutes an "armed conflict" in terms of article 1?
Any response to this question is inextricably tied to the definition
of "peoples" and the concept of self-determination. It is also based
on the premise that by adopting article 1, the world community sanc-
tions force as a legitimate means of achieving political goals. Once
these primary propositions are accepted, attention must focus on
what is considered the "threshold problem" in this area; i.e., the
difficulty of determining the point at which fighting between a gov-
ernment and its citizens becomes an "armed conflict" in terms of
amended article 1.
Instances of armed opposition to governmental authority range
from an attack by a group of a few individuals against a government
building to a well-supplied and well-disciplined army of thousands
waging an effective guerrilla war against government troops. What
criteria should be used to determine whether fighting within a certain
state has or has not reached the level of an "armed conflict"? Would
subject, article 1 of both the international covenants-the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by
the General Assembly in 1966-provides in identical language that "[a]ll peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."
These Covenants were adopted by G.A. Res. 2200,21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). The text is contained in 4 U.N. Monthly Chronicle (No. 2) at 41-
72 (Feb. 1967).
Six years earlier, in 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples acknowledged the "right" of "all peoples" to self-
determination. G.A. Res. 1564, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960). More recently, at its 25th Session, the General Assembly unanimously declared
that all peoples have the right to determine their political, economic, social and cul-
tural destiny without any external interference. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
18, at 122-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). Concomitantly, it urged all states to promote
the principles of "self-determination of peoples."
" As has been noted, the adoption of amended article 1 would apparently sanction
the use of force in order to achieve self-determination in certain instances. However,
in order to accord any degree of legitimacy and practical applicability to this article,
the world community must refute or amend specific provisions of the United Nations
Charter and allow those who would seek self-determination to kill and destroy in order
to attain this goal.
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the number of individuals involved be taken into consideration, the
amount of territory effectively controlled, the length of the struggle,
or the actual degree of combat activity involved? On the basis of
these criteria and others that might be formulated, could a determi-
nation be made that the current struggle in Northern Ireland consti-
tutes an "armed conflict" in terms of article 1? Indeed, would a
takeover of a reservation by armed Sioux Indians in South Dakota be
considered such a conflict?
55
These are difficult questions. However, if the international com-
munity chooses to sanction the use of force as a viable and legitimate
means of achieving self-determination, criteria must be developed to
measure whether fighting between a government and a portion of its
citizens has reached the level of the type of "armed conflict" ad-
dressed in article 1.
3. What organization or body will be authorized to make the
various determinations as to whether certain "peoples" are engaged
in an "'armed conflict" in order to achieve their "right of self-
determination"?
If the rights and protections afforded by Protocol I are to be
granted to individuals participating in the type of armed conflicts
referred to in article 1, it appears imperative that some organization
be granted the authority to determine which armed conflicts and also
which individuals are within the ambit of the article. Such an organi-
zation's task will not be an easy one, for it must decide whether a
group of individuals is in fact a "people," whether these particular
people have a "right of self-determination," and whether their activi-
ties can actually be considered an "armed conflict." All of these
decisions quite naturally depend on the formulation of specific cri-
teria upon which to base them.
Should the United Nations be granted this decision making au-
thority? If so, to what particular organ of the United Nations should
such a grant be made? The Security Council would most probably be
plagued by the veto. The General Assembly, now largely controlled
by third world and evolving states which so strongly support
amended article 1, consistently fails to deal in terms of political real-
ity. For this and other reasons, 56 any attempt to grant authority to
11 This refers to the recent armed seizure of an Indian Reservation in South
Dakota by a small number of Sioux. These individuals controlled a definite amount
of territory, issued "passports," and declared themselves citizens of an independent
state.
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the United Nations would be opposed by many of the major powers.
Perhaps the power to make these determinations will be given to
existing regional organizations. But a grant of such authority might
tempt the members of these bodies to influence greatly, albeit indi-
rectly, the internal affairs of neighboring states. In addition, it is
quite possible that the decisions of particular regional organizations
rendered with regard to questions surrounding the concept of self-
determination would not reflect a general consensus of the world
community. This is especially true in the context of the present situa-
tion in southern Africa.
The answer to this difficult problem might be found in the estab-
lishment of an independent body, designated under specific provi-
sions of Protocol I. However, organizational and functional difficul-
ties familiar to any international group would hinder all efforts along
this line. These difficulties need not be fully enumerated, .but they
would certainly include such questions as which states might serve,
how they would be elected or appointed, and the process by which
decisions would be made.
The inability of the international community to designate or
create an organization or body responsible for making the determina-
tions which amended article 2 inherently requires may well result in
unilateral, state-by-state decisions. The possibility of individual
countries endorsing and supporting 7 various "wars of self-
determination" around the globe is not an encouraging one.
There does exist the possibility that the majority of the delega-
tions attending the 1975 Diplomatic Conference will fail to see the
necessity of having any organization or state recognize a particular
struggle waged against a colonial or alien occupation or a racist re-
gime as being within the ambit of amended article 1. The determina-
tion may be made that any group of individuals may simply declare
its intention to wage a struggle against its government and file an
accession to Protocol I. On the basis of the views expressed and the
votes taken in 1974, this result is not inconceivable. It is this very fact
that evidences the significance of the final consideration.
" Included among these "other" reasons would most probably be the contention
that the United Nations Charter does not grant this degree of decision making author-
ity to the General Assembly. The validity of this assertion rests on the interpretation
of the functions and powers of the Assembly vis-a-vis the Security Council. This is the
subject of constant debate. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 10-14.
'" See text following note 42 supra.
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4. What is meant by the phrase "colonial and alien occupation
and racist regimes"?
This particular phrase has gained such popularity over the last
decade that few would even venture to question its meaning. Yet
when considered in the context of amended article 1, serious thought
must be given to what body may decide whether a regime is racist or
whether colonial or alien occupation actually does exist. Does the
United Nations alone have this authority? On the basis of what tangi-
ble criteria is such a determination to be made?"8 Even more signifi-
cant than these considerations is the fact that it is this very phrase
which so markedly indicates the singular purpose of article 1 and the
political motivation and historical naivete of those states which sup-
port it.
There exists little doubt that the specific purpose of amended
article I is not the advancement of humanitarianism in armed con-
flict, but the sanctioning of the use of force by a narrowly defined
category of individuals in order that they might achieve current po-
litical goals. This fact evidences the deleterious effect the adoption
of amended article 1 will have on the Law of War as a whole. Never-
theless, many states apparently lack either the ability or desire to
consider the long-range implications. These members of the world
community adamantly refuse to acknowledge that the now popular
"wars of national liberation" are a temporally and geographically
limited phenomenon and that the entire structure of the law should
not be knowingly and eagerly distorted in order to accommodate
them. This refusal exists despite the fact that some of the missionary
zeal exhibited by supporters of article 1 in 1974 has already been
dampened by recent events in Mozambigue and Angola.9
Is A recent example of United Nations decisionmaking regarding "colonial and
alien occupation" occurred in August of 1972. The Special Committee on Colonialism
decided to study the situation in Puerto Rico on the grounds that it is a colonial
territory of the United States entitled to independence. This was done despite the fact
that the latest referendum showed only 4,205 out of over 700,000 Puerto Ricans desired
such a status. The decision's politicized nature is evidenced by several comments of
the committee's Communist delegates. The Soviet representative, Vasily S. Safron-
chuk, told the committee that it was "dealing with the fate of 3 million people sub-
jected to ruthless exploitation . . . ." The PRC's counselor, Chang Yun-Kuan, de-
clared "Puerto Rico is in fact a colony of the United States, and the Puerto Rican
people's struggle for national independence is a just one. . . ." The Washington Post,
Aug. 29, 1972, at A-1, col. 4. These words and phrases have a now familiar ring about
them.
1' This refers to the significant steps recently taken by Portugal toward granting
these entities their independence.
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It is almost an inescapable conclusion that ten years hence the
adoption of article 1 will serve not only as a monument to the lack of
vision on the part of those states urging its acceptance, but also as a
testimonial to their willingness to sacrifice the future in order to
achieve short-range political desires. Indeed, it is ironic that the very
states that have so consistently and fervently urged the development
of a new and "universal" system of international law now demand the
adoption of a concept of such limited application.
Discussion of the preceding. factors reaffirms the obvious; many
difficult questions surround the circumstances under which certain
national liberation movements should be considered within the ambit
of amended article 1. Although these problems are obvious, they are
nonetheless being ignored by many states. A careful analysis of these
questions is essential if state delegations are fully to understand the
substantive impact of this provision upon the future development
and application of the Law of War.
C. The Effect Of Article 1 Upon Individual Combatants Engaged
In Armed Conflicts
The last of the primary concerns of those states opposed to the
adoption of amended article 1 is the possibility that it will result in
the unequal application of the Law of War to individual combatants.
As logic dictates, the humanitarian aspects of the Law of War,"0 em-
bodied in the form of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, have always been
based on the presumption that the individual soldier would not be
held responsible for the decision of his state to wage war. The rights
and protections accorded under the Conventions apply equally to all
combatants and civilians who suffer and die in armed conflicts. Each
of the four Conventions clearly sets forth, the proposition that the
benefits and burdens contained therein are afforded both to the ag-
gressor and to the victims of aggression. As previously noted, it was
the original intent of the drafters of Protocol I to reaffirm and develop
the guarantees codified in the four Conventions.
By stipulating that some but not all struggles for self-
determination are international conflicts within the ambit of
amended article 1, Committee I rejected the concept of universality
upon which Protocol I was originally based. In so doing, it has laid
go For purposes of this article, the Law of War is viewed as embodying conflict
management norms, rules pertaining to the means and methods of conducting combat
and the humanitarian protections accorded victims of armed conflict. See text accom-
panying note 4 supra.
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the groundwork for the unequal and subjective application of the
provisions of the Protocol. Implicit in the adoption of article 1 is the
emergence of a legal scheme that would deny the status of permissible
combatants to members of forces opposing certain efforts to achieve
self-determination. Stated succinctly, a majority of the international
community has chosen to revive the concept of the "just war."
Evidence of this fact lies in the contention by some states that all
law applicable to armed conflict must consider the just nature of a
cause of self-determination and also prohibit assistance to or protec-
tion of "aggressors." Thus, in those situations where a state must
resort to armed force in order to oppose a group of "people" engaged
in an "armed conflict" considered to be within the ambit of amended
article 1, individual combatants opposing such struggles may be
viewed as participants in a criminal war and therefore treated as war
criminals rather than as prisoners of war if captured. Manifestations
of this idea include the existence of a Soviet bloc reservation to article
85 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (GPW), the treatment of United States prisoners held captive
by the North Vietnamese, and the extended concept of war crimes
and crimes against humanity reflected in Soviet and Chinese thought
and incorporated in various United Nations General Assembly Reso-
lutions.
Article 85 of the GPW1' provides that prisoners of war prosecuted
for pre-capture offenses retain the applicable benefits afforded all
prisoners under this Convention even if convicted. 2 However, each
Communist state has filed a reservation to the effect that prisoners
of war convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity under
the Nuremberg principles will be treated as common criminals. 3 An
example of the implementation of this reservation was the treatment
of United States prisoners in North Viet Nam. Although the North
Vietnamese did not prosecute any American prisoners of war for war
crimes, they did deny POW status to all United States captives and
sought to justify their denial on the grounds that the prisoners were
" GPW, supra note 6, art. 85.
6Z For the reasoning behind this provision, see COMMENTARY (Pictet), supra note
49, at 415-16.
North Vietnam's reservation to article 85 provides:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners of war
prosecuted and convicted for war crimes or for crimes against human-
ity, in accordance with principles laid down by the Nuremberg Court
of Justice, shall not benefit from the present Convention, as specified
in article 85.
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war criminals. Since present Communist doctrine defining war
crimes and crimes against humanity is broad enough to include indi-
vidual combatants fighting against socialism or alleged wars of self-
determination, amended article 1 will go far toward providing a codi-
fied legal base upon which Communist states can level war crime
charges against captives in future conflicts.
Indicative of current Soviet thought regarding the question of
what constitutes a war crime is this passage from a recently published
Soviet text on international law:
Resolutions of the twenty-fifth session of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations firmly require specifically that
the regime of the military prisoner be applied to the partisans
under conditions of national liberation war, for example, in the
territories under Portuguese rule, or in Namibia, ...
It is necessary to emphasize that the legality of partisan
movements is closely bound with the legal, just character of
the war of the country on whose side the partisans are acting.
A totally different international-legal evaluation must be given
the actions of any type of irregular units which an aggressor
might use, designating them "partisans." Specifically, one
should view as totally devoid of any such legality the attempts
of the U.S.A. to create units of "partisans" designed for dis-
patch to other countries with the goal of suppressing a
national-liberation movement of peoples and for conducting
diversionary covert operations. Actually, this is not a partisan
movement, but one of the forms of intervention, a violation of
widely recognized norms of contemporary international law. 4
This same philosophy is reflected in United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII), Basic Principles of the Legal
Status of Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domi-
nation and Racist Regimes. As previously noted, the resolution's
preamble reaffirms the proposition that colonialism is a crime which
all colonial people have a right to oppose by any means at their
disposal. 5 Aside from the operative provisions already discussed,"
two others are especially noteworthy:
4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien dom-
ination and racist regimes captured as prisoners are to be ac-
SBLISHCHENKO, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw - (1972).
'5 See note 37 supra.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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corded the status of prisoners of war and their treatment
should be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva
Convention relatives to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of
12 August 1949.
5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes
against the national liberation movements struggling for their
freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and
alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the
mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals."7
It is quite apparent from these provisions that a return to the "just
war" concept is likely to lead to unequal treatment of victims on the
several sides of a conflict, depending upon whether the cause for
which they fight is recognized as "just"; i.e., within the ambit of
amended article 1. This fact must necessarily be of great concern to
those states truly committed to the impartial application of humani-
tarian safeguards to all victims of armed conflict.
IV. THE 1975 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE: OPTIONAL
COURSES OF U.S. ACTION
In light of the preceding analysis of the three primary areas of
concern to the United States regarding the seemingly inevitable
adoption of amended article 1 by the 1975 Diplomatic Conference, it
is apparent that article 1 will sanction the use of force by various
individuals or states in order to achieve certain, but not all, political
goals. This will result in the vitiation of existing codified conflict
management norms. Additionally, it is quite conceivable that no
means can be formulated whereby determinations can be made as to
whether certain liberation movements should or should not be consid-
ered within the ambit of amended article 1. A failure to create such
a mechanism will likely result in these determinations being made on
an individual, state-by-state basis. Furthermore, a return to the con-
cept of the "just war" of self-determination may lead to the treat-
ment of individual combatants fighting on the "wrong" side in such
wars as "war criminals." Such a designation could then be utilized
as a legal basis upon which to deny these individuals prisoner of war
status.
As the United States delegation prepares to attend the 1975 Diplo-
matic Conference, several avenues of approach toward the difficulties
posed by amended article 1 might be taken. The United States may
11 U.N.G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
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choose to work toward the defeat of article 1. However, the degree of
support exhibited for the measure and events which have occurred
since that time" indicate that the article's adoption is inevitable.
Barring some unforeseen reversal of attitude, the concept of the "just
war" will become an integral part of Protocol I. Thus, any concerted
effort on the part of the United States to defeat article 1 in its present
form will not only end in failure but will also act to solidify the efforts
of the proponents of the measure.
Alternatively, the United States might turn its efforts toward mit-
igating the effect of article 1 upon existing international law by pro-
posing various amendments to other articles in Protocol I. In pursuing
this approach, the United States might condition any acceptance of
national liberation movements as parties to Protocol I and possibly
the Geneva Conventions or as beneficiaries on a reciprocal basis, on
a reaffirmation of article 85 of the GPW.69 A reaffirmation of this
nature could be made an integral part of article 421o of Protocol I. This
68 A meeting of various state delegates was held in San Remo, Italy, in late August
and early September of 1974 in order to discuss a compromise solution to the problems
posed by amended article 1. Nothing of a substantive nature was accomplished; no
change in the respective attitudes of the parties had occurred.
" For a discussion of the provisions of this article and the Communist countries'
reservations to it, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
7o The text of article 42 provides:
ARTICLE 42. - NEW CATEGORY OF PRISONERS OF WAR
1. In addition to the persons mentioned in article 4 of the Third
Convention, members of organized resistance movements who have
fallen into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war provided such
movements belong to a Party to the conflict, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power, and provided that such movements fulfill the follow-
ing conditions:
(a) that they are under a command responsible to a Party to the
conflict for its subordinates;
(b) that they distinguish themselves from the civilian popula-
tion in military operations;
(c) that they conduct their military operations in accordance
with the Conventions and the present Protocol.
2. Non-fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions by individ-
ual members of the resistance movement shall not deprive other mem-
bers of the movement of the status of prisoners of war. Members of a
resistance movement who violate the Conventions and the present
Protocol shall, if prosecuted enjoy the judicial guarantees provided by
the Third Convention and, even if sentenced, retain the status of
prisoners of war.*
*Note
If, as many Governments wished, the Diplomatic Conference
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article could be amended to provide that violations of international
law applicable in armed conflict, other than failure to combatants to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, would not result
in forfeiture of prisoner of war status or the benefits of the GPW by
any person referred to in article 471 of the Convention or in proposed
article 42 of Protocol I.
should decide to mention in the present Protocol members of move-
ments of armed struggle for self-determination, a solution would be
to include in this Article a third paragraph worded as follows:
3. In cases of armed struggle where peoples exercise their right
to self-determination as guaranteed by the United Nations Charter
and the "Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the Unite d Nations," members of organized liberation
movements who comply with the aforementioned conditions shall be
treated as prisoners of war for as long as they are detained.
71 GPW, supra note 6 provides:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen
into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volun-
teer corps, including those of organized resistance move-
ments, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, includ-
ing such organized resistance movements, fulfill the follow-
ing conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in ac-
cordance with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess alle-
giance to a government or an authority not recognized by
the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without ac-
tually being members thereof, such as civilian members of
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contrac-
tors, members of labour units or of services responsible for
the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with
an identity card similar to the annexed model.
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While such an "amendment approach" might prove to be sub-
stantially more successful than an effort to defeat the adoption of
article 1, it must be recognized that any attempt to alter significantly
the purpose or effect of this article will be viewed with suspicion and
distrust by many state delegations. The suggested reaffirmation of
article 85 would provoke a strong reaction on the part of Communist
states. Indeed, if the conference should adopt a United States pro-
posal along these lines, it is likely that the Communist countries
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and ap-
prentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of
international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist
the invading forces, without having had time to form them-
selves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war
under the present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed
forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power con-
siders it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern
them, even though it has originally liberated them while
hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in
particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful
attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and
which are engaged in combat or where they fail to comply
with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumer-
ated in the present Article, who have been received by neu-
tral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom
these Powers are required to intern under international law,
without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which
these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of
Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and,
where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the
conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned,
those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such
diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards
them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the
present Convention, without prejudice to the functions
which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with
diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical per-
sonnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Con-
vention.
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would interpose new reservations to article 85 which are more objec-
tionable than the present ones. The United States would then have
to give serious consideration to an outright rejection of all reserva-
tions to the article, which would result in the absence of a treaty
relationship between the reserving and rejecting parties.
Communist opposition to United States efforts to mitigate the
effects of article 1 is a certainty. However, the most intense and
concerted opposition to such efforts will come from the lesser devel-
oped and third world states. To these countries, the amended article
represents much more than a simple change in a particular interna-
tional agreement. It is viewed as a victory for the "have-nots" against
the "haves"; for the weak but united against the strong; for the for-
merly oppressed against their former oppressors. To the developing
nations, it is visible evidence of the fact that international jurisprud-
ence must now reflect the desires and goals of all nations, and espe-
cially of the hitherto diplomatically unimportant developing coun-
tries, rather than those of the relatively few developed and industrial-
ized societies. It is a visible symbol of a long sought moral and politi-
cal victory.
As a result, a majority of those states advocating the adoption of
amended article 1 are not concerned with its legal ramifications or the
impact these will have on the United Nations Charter and other
codified concepts of the Law of War. Many quite candidly state that
if adoption of article 1 causes legal problems, they will belong to the
developed, industrialized nations and not to those advocating adop-
tion of the article. Stimulated by the prospect of achieving what they
consider to be a stunning political victory, these third world coun-
tries' pervasive attitude appears to be "The law be damned-we
won."
In the face of attitudes such as these, there exists the strong possi-
bility that all attempts by the United States to mitigate the effects
of article 1 through the amendment process will be forcefully and
effectively rebuffed. Moreover, serious consideration must be given as
to whether such an approach should be attempted. Even if successful
in all of its efforts toward amendment, could the United States effec-
tively negate the impact article 1 would have on existing interna-
tional norms? Could amendments, regardless of the precision of their
wording, offset sanctioning of the use of force in order to achieve
political goals or clarify the vague and subjective nature of the arti-
cle's applicability, while simultaneously protecting those combatants
deemed to be opposing a "just war"? Would any number of amend-
ments alter the deleterious effect article 1 will have on each of the
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four Geneva Conventions, those international agreements which Pro-
tocols I and II were originally intended to supplement and clarify?
And what of Protocol H? No amendment can reinstate a feeling of
necessity for this document, now rendered moot for all intents and
purposes.
The argument can be made that in order to avoid being omitted
from the "mainstream" of current international thinking, the United
States should agree to the adoption of article 1 and then focus its
efforts on a just and objective application of its terms. There is little
chance that an approach of this kind would meet with success. Fur-
thermore, it is doubtful whether such "behind the scenes" maneuver-
ing on the part of the United States would effectively compensate for
the apparent sanctioning of concepts so alien to the traditional Amer-
ican view of the proper use of force and the concept of humanitarian
protection. Can the United States affort to accord itself the luxury
of convenient hypocrisy in an area of such basic concern and import-
ance? Should the United States delegation, in an effort to reach
agreement on specific provisions of Protocol I, be willing to reduce the
overriding question of the applicability of all of the Protocol's provi-
sions to a matter of subjective and emotional judgment? Would this
form of "compromise" really advance the cause of humanitarian
rights in armed conflict or accomplish the original intent of the draf-
ters of the Protocol? Is some form of agreement so vital to American
interests that the United States delegation must be willing to jeop-
ardize the 1949 Conventions and various other codified norms of
international law?
It would be both unwise and unnecessary to sacrifice so much in
order to achieve so little. If states advocating the acceptance of
amended article 1 refuse to discuss its revision or specific guidelines
with regard to when and how it will be applied, then the United
States should frankly and concisely explain why it will not become a
party to an international agreement which can appropriately be
characterized as nebulous, subjective, and hypocritical. Rather than
lend its support to a Protocol which apparently confirms all the famil-
iar charges leveled against international jurisprudence as a whole, the
United States should focus its efforts on preserving currently existing
conflict management norms and the humantiarian protections and
safeguards contained within the 1949 Conventions.
There does exist the strong possibility that Protocol I as amended
will be accepted by a majority of the states attending the 1975 Diplo-
matic Conference, with or without American support for the measure.
However, it is not incumbent upon the United States to become a
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party to an unworkable and ill-advised document. Indeed, the oppos-
ite is true. An American refusal to append its signature to Protocol I
will not result in a loss of the rights and privileges accorded American
.soldiers involved in combat under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
These exist as specifically required guarantees and are not based on
political and subjective judgments. Moreover, a decision on the part
of the United States to refuse to lend even its tacit support to Protocol
I and its inherent political objectives may cause other states to give
more serious consideration to the legal ramifications of article 1.
When international law is reduced to an instrument which reflects
only narrowly defined political aspirations, all states in the world
community suffer. This fact must be repeatedly and systematically
emphasized in the international forum.
The events of the 1974 Diplomatic Conference clearly evidence
that the international community, in its present historical and politi-
cal context, is unwilling and unprepared to move forward in advanc-
ing the cause of human rights in armed conflicts.72 The protections
and guarantees set forth in Protocol I will become lost in a morass of
political and subjective judgments. Until the concept of "just war"
is again recognized as an invalid rationale upon which to base death
and destruction, no real progress in this area can be realized. The task
confronting the United States in 1975 and in the years to come will
therefore be to preserve existing norms and protections, for unless
currently existing law is both preserved and shielded from inconsist-
ent, politicized application during the next several years, there will
exist no basis upon which to build in the future. A failure to meet this
challenge and a decision to yield to short-range political expediency
in the name of "compromise" will only hasten the world's return to
the eleventh century. 3
12There is a recent occurrence which vividly confirms this proposition. The Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, with the help of the Arab bloc, prepared a United Na-
tions General Assembly Resolution which recognizes the right of the Palestinian people
to return immediately to their homeland and to establish a sovereign state. The Reso-
lution recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to attain these goals "by all means
at their disposal .... " a phrase viewed as encompassing the use of force and terror.
The Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1974, at A-17, col. 1. An amended resolution was
adopted. The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1974, §1, at 1, col. 1. It recognized the right
of the Palestinians to regain their "rights by all means in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations . . . " Id. § 1, at 4, col. 3.
" The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance afforded him by Mr. Walde-
mar A. Solf, Chief, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army.
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